SPECIAL REPORT

Balancing American Strategy In An Age Of Near-Peer Competition

Facing the escalating threat from China, it is crucial for the U.S. to reassess its security commitments to Ukraine and make a strategic pivot to Asia, a move vital for protecting the liberal order and defending democratic values.

By | Alexander Bergh , MARCH 01, 2024 / 03:06 PM

This ilustration has been created by Foreign Analysis editor team.

The return of interstate war to the European continent on February 24, 2022 was a watershed moment in geopolitical history. Not only did the full-scale invasion of Ukraine shatter a three-generation-long peace in Europe but typified the rise of increasingly assertive authoritarian regimes eager to use military force to challenge the Liberal International Order. An increasingly assertive and risky stance taken by the People’s Republic of China toward Taiwan and the so-called “Nine Dash Line”, for example, strains the capacity of the Liberal Order’s champion, the United States to maintain its position as the unipolar hegemon. Indeed, democracy and multilateralism are under duress. The rise of near-peer competition in East Asia must push Washington to enact a “new pivot to Asia” to defend its leadership and deter further democratic erosion. 
 
In an era of increasingly bipolarity, Washington must balance its strategic and security commitments abroad to avoid overreach and ultimately decline. The rise and fall of empires are determined by how the hegemon responds to crises and balances its commitments abroad. The high humanitarian, economic, and military costs of World War II handicapped France and the United Kingdom’s ability to stymy revolutions in their colonies in Africa and Asia. The Invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989) devastated the Soviet Union’s economy and military and thus limited its ability to maintain its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Consequentially, it lacked the capacity to repress revolutions across the Warsaw Pact in 1989. The common thread between decolonization and the color revolutions was hegemonic overreach. The US is not a new hegemon, and its influence has already been stretched as demonstrated in its interventions in Somalia (1993), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) Iraq (2003). If it wishes to retain its hegemony, it must rebalance its commitments. 
 
The British and French Empires as well as the Soviet Union overreached into too many theaters and thus could not stave off the most pressing challenges that ultimately solidified their declines. Overreach led to the disintegration of the vestiges of colonialism and communism. To avoid the decline of the Liberal World Order and its institutions, a new “pivot to Asia” to counter the multifaceted threat posed by the People’s Republic of China is imperative. To remain competitive in a world increasingly characterized by near-peer competition from Beijing, Washington must shift its security commitments to the East by reducing its security and financial footprint in European defense and security. Simply put, the United States cannot afford to continue its campaign against Russia by funding a proxy war in Ukraine while it faces a potent and increasingly emboldened China. The cost of funding Ukraine perpetually pales in comparison to the specter of overreach instigated by the rise of China.
 
Supporting Kyiv’s war effort against Russia provided the United States considerable strategic and security net gains over the first eighteen months of the conflict not to mention soft power incentives. Providing security, development, and humanitarian assistance to President Zelensky’s government demonstrated the United States’ resolute commitment to the rules-based order. However, after nearly two years of war and a largely inconclusive counteroffensive, (to the cost of $41 billion to the American taxpayer) the war is now ‘frozen.’ Territorial changes have stagnated. Despite Yevgeny Prigozhin’s march on Moscow, the sinking of the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and the delivery of advanced weaponry including M1A1 Abrams Tanks, HIMARS systems, and the Patriot Air Defense system, Ukrainian military leaders have failed to capitalize and reclaim territory in recent months. 
 
Taken by itself, further military assistance appears frugal and unlikely to dramatically shape the tactical outcomes. However, when paired with the rise of an increasingly bellicose China with a demonstrated history of openly challenging American leadership, and continued support to Ukraine undermines Washington’s ability to counter China and deter it from further brinkmanship. Thus, the United States must shift its security commitments and focus to more pressing allies and theaters abroad. Pushing for a negotiated peace and a ceasefire in Ukraine will allow Washington to concentrate its security focus on the emerging adversary: China. 
 
The US should encourage European states to engage greater with the conflict by providing hard power: equipment, weaponry. Nixon Doctrine must guide American policy where the US will support its allies but not be carrying the lion’s share of the duties in Europe. A strategic shift from Europe is vital for defending democracy in Asia. The rise of China and its institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Belt and Road Initiative demand a strategic shift to defend democracy and liberal values in an increasingly volatile region dubbed by some pundits a “new cold war.” The rise of China ultimately threatens bedrock democratic values, allies, and the network of alliances Washington took decades to create. China’s increasingly hostile security posture, if unabetted, will pose not only an ideological threat to American institutions and allies but a security threat. 
 
The movement of increasingly aggressive Chinese naval patrols in the South and East China Seas in addition to the flight of the notorious spy balloon over the United States in February 2023 typify the threat posed by China. To adequately meet the challenge posed by Beijing, Washington should consider lowering troop levels in Europe, decreasing security assistance to Ukraine, and pushing NATO member states to meet the Warsaw Conference target of 2.0% defense spending to develop security autonomy in favor of increased support for Taiwan. Continued support for a ‘frozen’ conflict in Ukraine distracts from the most pressing threat posed by a near-peer China. Failure to meet and deter security and ideological threats posed by China gives a tacit acceptance of Beijing’s increasingly potent sphere of influence and its bellicose military maneuvers. Most salient is the notion that the United States cannot defend and enforce its interests if it continues to be embroiled in Europe. 
 
The rise of China with near-peer military and economic capabilities is a preeminent challenge to the American-led Liberal World Order. While Beijing and Washington have developed areas of cooperation, the narrative of competition is prevailing over cooperation. To meet and deter challenges posed by China, Washington and its allies must reconsider their security commitments to ancillary theaters, specifically ‘frozen’ war in Ukraine. The stagnation of the Russo-Ukrainian War and the failure of Ukrainian military leaders to achieve kinetic and tactical net gains over the past twelve months despite substantial security assistance demands a prevailing shift to more pressing theaters. 
 
Specifically, reaffirming and deepening alliances like AUKUS, Five Eyes, and mutual defense treaties with South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand are vital for deterring further Chinese aggression toward Taiwan and the larger patchwork of liberal and democratic values in East Asia. Enforcing Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) and bolstering security assistance to Taiwan cannot be understated. Reviving agreements like the Comprehensive and Prograsive Transpacific Partnership will not only provide downstream economic benefits to Washington and American firms but signal its commitment to advancing democracy and free-market capitalism in East Asia. 
 
The case of Taiwan typifies the security and ideational prerogatives for a new pivot to Asia. Maintaining freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait is imperative for American leaders to continue to project power in East Asia and the stability of American-led markets. Roughly 88% of the world’s largest ships (by tonnage) passed through the Taiwan Straits in 2023 thereby affirming it as one of the most vital maritime chokepoints on the planet. Further, Taiwan’s dominance of the semiconductor industry (producing over 60% of semiconductors globally and 90% of the most advanced versions) make defending it and its surrounding waterways indispensable.
 
A prolonged Chinese blockade or invasion of Taiwan would produce significant economic and security consequences threatening the fabric of American hegemony. Finally, Taiwan is a flourishing democracy and a vanguard of liberal governance in a region containing several authoritarian regimes. It is for those strategic and ideational reasons that American policymakers must look to the East instead of deepening their engagement in Europe. Abandoning Ukraine and Europe is not the answer for defending the Liberal Order and democracy in East Asia, but a strategic shift from Europe to Asia is a necessity to defend democracy, boost multilateralism, and reaffirm American global leadership. Balancing diplomatic rhetoric and bilateral security relationships is essential for maintaining the America-led world order. 
 

Alexander Bergh is one of the active writer of the Foreign Analysis