Syria and the Arab Spring
Ending or Beginning?
By | James Bowden,
January 29, 2025
I can clearly remember sitting in my car listening to the radio when news of the riots in Tunisia started. A man who was seeking work lit himself on fire in protest over economic conditions in that country. That fire lit a fuse that burned across eastern North Africa, burned through Egypt, and spread out to the entire region, going south to Saudi Arabia, straight to Kuwait, and north to Syria. Breathlessly called the Arab Spring by reporters, it was hoped that such a movement would finally bring democracy to a region of the world that had only known kings and dictators.
It was honestly hard to hope and not be cynical that such a movement would fail, and the news that came from the protests in Syria made it look like that promise and hope had failed. In early December of 2024, a renewed push in the long-stalled rebellion finally pushed the government of Bashar al-Assad out and saw the ascension of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group, along with a coalition of other groups, into the place of the government. The world now waits to see if the promise of the Arab Spring, defeated and unfulfilled in so many Middle Eastern countries, will finally be fulfilled in this one place. There is still no answer.
Where Syria Has Been
The Arab Spring began in Syria in 2011 as a series of peaceful protests against the government. The protests were held in Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs, and mainly focused on being led by younger Syrians who were ready to move from dictatorship to democracy or at least increased liberalization of national policy and the restrictions they were under. The movement was not likely to create an American-style government, but there was a desire to no longer be under the repression of the Syrian security apparatus and a desire for religious expression and freedom. Again, this was mostly directed towards Islamic sects that had long been persecuted or whose members were ignored in the socio-economic model.
Perspective-changing analysis
Follow the world with Foreing Analysis
In the State of the Union 2023, in the advent of von der Leyen’s second term, she reaffirmed her commitment to leading the EU through its ongoing challenges. She highlighted the importance of continued economic recovery, climate action, and further integration of European defence capabilities. In this sense, her candidacy for a second term has been seen as a bid to solidify her legacy, driving forward her agenda for a more unified and resilient Europe. However, the new roles and appointments of EU officials under her leadership have reignited concerns about the EU’s democratic deficiencies. The concentration of power in the Commission and the perceived sidelining of national governments raised questions about the democratic legitimacy of such appointments, sparking debates about the future direction of the Union and the balance of power within its institutions
The Druze and Alawite were two leading sects that, despite the Assad family’s following, were still largely relegated to the margins of Syrian life. Despite early hope and signs that the movement might create positive, real change in Syria, there came a turning point in late 2011 and early 2012 when the Syrian government began to crack down on the protests, first through arrests, then through security forces, and finally by calling in the military against the people. Video from protest marches shows people gathered and chanting slogans, with sudden, violent explosions igniting and scattering the crowd, killing young children who had come to the rallies with their parents.
From 2013 to 2015, the weight of advance was on the side of the rebels, and the Assad government came close to being toppled in late 2015 when Russia stepped in and rescued the government by providing direct military support through air and ground intervention. The Assad government then launched a campaign featuring their use of the Falaq battlefield missile system against civilians, targeting their apartments and other areas of the cities rather than international threats. This resulted in a steady pushback to the point that the rebels only held onto isolated enclaves of power, both inside Damascus and in the major cities.
Aleppo remained the largest holdout of resistance to the government. It was during this period that Türkiye also began its war on the Kurdish north, taking advantage of the weak government presence there to launch attacks against the Kurds, and the city of Manbij entered the news from then on. Apart from the ISIS, or Daesh, interlude in 2014-15, there had been stable peace, a recognized stalling of both the government and the various rebel factions holding from 2015 to 2024. The frozen rebellion was largely a result of the continued presence and missions of Russian forces, particularly the Wagner Group deployed to keep the lines static in the country.
That fire lit a fuse that burned across eastern North Africa, burned through Egypt, and spread out to the entire region, going south to Saudi Arabia, straight to Kuwait, and north to Syria.
Where We Are At
The Assad government fell on December 8, 2024, and the process of building a new, replacement government is still only in its infancy. There have been some remarkable changes even in the short time since that fall, and there are early signs that the new government is sincere about making substantial changes in how Syria is governed. Some of the earliest indications of positive change took place during Christmas, when many hundreds of Syrians gathered in downtown Damascus to call on the government for more freedoms.
Rather than shutting down the gathering, the government appeared to support it and allowed it not only to continue late into the night but also to be broadcast on a live stream. Stories appeared a few days later with images of Orthodox Christians worshipping and celebrating Christmas in a manner that was not possible under previous governments. This new religious freedom does not appear to have been gained at the expense of the government, but by its openness.
In early January, the new government received delegations from Germany and France, as well as delegations from regional powers, including Iran, Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. This quick re-entry into the Arab fold has promised many opportunities for the government to quickly gather the resources it needs for governance. In late mid-January, the United States rescinded a partial number of sanctions that had been imposed on all levels of economic and government activity. Sanctions placed on the old government, local businesses, and individuals were relaxed in an effort to increase the flow of much-needed infrastructure-building and stabilizing materials.
Over the course of January 2025, there have been a large number of stories, both in the press and on other platforms online, that Syrian officials have intercepted and halted the shipment of illegal drugs. They have seized guns and other weapons from rebel groups and, in the last week of the month, seized and impounded a shipment of arms from Iran destined for Hezbollah. These are promising steps, but they could also be signs of a deeper, more specific purpose. It is likely that, with the Israeli destruction of so many arms and munitions in the days following the fall of Assad, the Syrian government is desperate to gather arms and munitions from any source. It is still possible, in this respect, that the weapons could be used against different regional enemies, specifically Israel, in the future.
Where Do We Go From Here?
One of the most important questions is: where do we go from here? The major world powers, the United States and Russia, will likely attempt to steer the outcome as best as possible. For Russia, they have significant interests in ensuring the establishment of some well-ordered government. Russia must protect its military port at Tartus and ensure its access there and at Latakia, which supports it with an airport. The Russians have oil and natural gas stations in Syria, and they will want to secure those both in tangible terms of physical property and continued operation, as well as secure lasting extraction agreements from the government or governments that will emerge in these areas. It is likely that Russian involvement will be much deeper and more resilient than that of the United States.
The United States and its involvement remain the biggest unknown. Before Donald Trump became president of the United States, a major portion of the chaos had settled, with only the northern area under the control of the SDF remaining as a place of significant violence, and that primarily against the government of Türkiye. There still remains the need to secure oil and natural gas rights and, as with Russia, ensure the security of the physical sites as well as the prior established agreements. There were early signals in December that the incoming administration would not support restoration efforts in Syria and that there appeared to be no Syria issue on the radar. That may change if Israel cannot contain the fragmentation on its borders. The Biden administration, so willing to get involved more deeply in Ukraine and other places despite its lame-duck status, did not signal nor make any move in the direction of assisting or directing the situation in Syria, reflecting the continued abandonment of the region by both administrations.
Thus, as we stand here and look, Janus-like, at the past and the future, we are still left with the ambiguous answer to the question: is this the fulfillment of the promise of the Arab Spring?
A wild-card nation is Ukraine. Ukrainian intelligence became involved in Syria to undermine the Russian war effort and to draw more resources to Syria and away from the main European battlefield. Ukrainian intelligence worked with many of the rebel groups, arming them with anti-aircraft guns, new American M16 rifles, and other equipment that was sent from Europe to aid the Ukrainian battlefront. The arming and training of HTS in this regard gave them a substantial increase in firepower and capability, which they translated into effective battlefield operations. However, it is possible that, now with the situation largely successful, they will pull back their involvement.
Several nations are lined up to carve up the Syrian carcass. Türkiye, Israel, and Iran all have a stake in the shape that the government takes as well as the contours of its future borders. Israel has long sought to put pressure on Syria and to have greater security on the Golan Heights frontier. They have been hitting Syrian targets, attempting to eliminate weapons and munitions that could be directed against them. While this has been a long-term phenomenon already, the level of escalation has been unprecedented. The strikes will likely accomplish the goal of keeping these from coming into the hands of foreign or domestic bad actors in Syria, but they may also hobble the effectiveness of the future government of Syria. It will likely ensure that there will be a long domestic conflict cycle in which various groups will seek to break away along ethnic and religious lines.
Iran will likely seek to re-enter relations with any new government in Syria or what may become a predominantly Damascus-based government. They have long sought to have a forward operating strategy of confronting Israel through Syria and Lebanon in the form of the Shia Crescent. Israel has dismantled a significant portion of this during its year-plus-long war, and the chaos in Syria will likely extend this. However, Iran has been able to successfully co-opt weak and dysfunctional Arab governments, such as Iraq and Yemen, in the recent past, and this creates one more opportunity to entice a government with easy arms and cash to support them against Israel.
But looking even further ahead, we cannot help but consider whether the initial steps taken are only temporary measures adopted to foster goodwill that might change in the future. Prior governments came to power with similar promises of freedom and security, only to quickly turn into the same dictatorial governments as the ones they had replaced—same policies, different faces. The proof will come in the next year or two, more likely within a year. We will have to wait to see if they will turn these weapons on the people of Syria, Israel, or if they will be content to have a self-contained policy and perhaps future leadership of the Arab Middle East.
HTS was initially founded on the premise that they would eventually attack Israel and reclaim al-Quds, Jerusalem, only scaling back these claims and ambitions later in their history. Despite the elimination of these aims from their websites and popular media, the question remains whether they are sincere about this change of mind or are simply very aware that they cannot gain Western backing and the support they need with such stated goals. Is the change genuine or completely political and temporary? Thus, as we stand here and look, Janus-like, at the past and the future, we are still left with the ambiguous answer to the question: is this the fulfillment of the promise of the Arab Spring? We can only reply, maybe.